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1 Introduction
The Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies has been a fundamental principle in the science of perception
since its christening by Johannes Peter Mu¨ller in his Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen (1833–40).
This Doctrine asserts that we perceive in the first instance the activity of our sensory nerves, not the
external properties that stimulate them. This counterintuitive claim rests upon a putative empirical
result: the basic qualities of perceptual experience are not determined by, and thus do not reveal the
natures of, basic properties in the world. I call this core result the skeptical conclusion. This skeptical
conclusion exercised enormous influence over both psychology and philosophy in the latter part of the
19th century, but is it still relevant today? Historically, one motivation for resisting the result has been
the worry that it implies global skepticism. Part I argued that such skepticism is not in fact an obligatory
consequence of the Doctrine, and that Mu¨ller himself took it to motivate a form of epistemic structural
realism. Here, I turn from these primarily exegetical issues to implications for contemporary work in
perception and philosophy, arguing for the continued importance of both the Doctrine itself, and its
structuralist interpretation, today.
In order to assess the ongoing relevance of the Doctrine’s skeptical conclusion, there are three main
issues to address. First, insofar as it is understood as an empirical result, is this result still accepted
in the contemporary science of perception? Should it turn out that the Doctrine remains scientifically
valid, then we must consider its implications for the philosophy of perception. Prima facie, the skeptical
conclusion directly contradicts both na¨ıve realism, the view that external properties themselves participate
in perceptual experience, and those forms of representationalism on which experience transparently reveals
features of the world;1 but more importantly, does it also suggest some positive philosophical moral?
Finally, structuralism as an epistemological position is particularly prominent in current philosophy of
science, and, as Part I demonstrated, Mu¨ller’s own structuralism about the epistemology of perception
was continuous with his structuralism about the epistemology of science. This motivates a question
for the history of philosophy of science, namely whether the Doctrine played any significant role in the
historical trajectory of structuralist accounts of scientific knowledge, and whether it should demand the
attention of contemporary structural realists.
1These views have lately experienced a resurgence; for some pertinent surveys, see Genone (2016), Tye (2014), and Crane
and French (2017). Na¨ıve realism about color (e.g. Allen 2016) presents a particularly stark contrast to the view developed
here.
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Hermann von Helmholtz is a linchpin figure for all three of these issues. Helmholtz was a student
of Mu¨ller’s in Berlin, completing a doctoral dissertation under his supervision in 1842. Subsequently,
Helmholtz made major contributions to physiology, psychology, thermodynamics, electromagnetism, and
the foundations of geometry, becoming unquestionably the most influential German scientist, if not
scientist simpliciter, of the latter half of the 19th century. With regards to the empirical claims of
the Doctrine, Helmholtz’s pioneering work in the physiology of visual and auditory perception both
introduced the most significant breaks with Mu¨ller’s theory to persist in contemporary psychology, and
explicitly reaffirmed the correctness of Mu¨ller’s Doctrine in its essentials. In popularizing these results, he
established the relevance of sensory physiology for epistemology (Cassirer 1950, 4), and as the foremost
proponent of a return to Kant involving closer dialog between science and philosophy, Helmholtz may even
be considered “one of the principal founders of the discipline we now call philosophy of science” (Friedman
1997, 19). Both directly, through his own writings, and indirectly, through his student Heinrich Hertz,
Helmholtz exerted enormous influence on early scientific structuralists such as Cassirer and Schlick.
These then are the answers I will defend to the above questions, each guided in part by the views
and influence of Helmholtz. First, as an empirical result, the Doctrine remains as valid today as in the
time of Mu¨ller. In fact, the methodological presuppositions required to derive its skeptical conclusion
play a foundational role in the science of perception, and thus it constitutes an ineliminable tenet of
the naturalistic worldview. Consequently, second, any naturalistic philosophy of perception must accept
the skeptical claim that the intrinsic qualities of experience are not those of the world. I argue that the
most plausible maneuver to save realism in the face of this result is to adopt some form of structural
realism. Finally, it is easy to demonstrate that the Doctrine played some significant role in the early
history of scientific structuralism, insofar as it motivated Helmholtz, who himself inspired a number of
early 20th century structuralists. While the facts of perception no longer play an evidentiary role for most
modern philosophers of science, I argue that sensory physiology may still serve as a valuable exemplar
for contemporary structural realisms.
2 The Doctrine Today
The skeptical conclusion of the Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies asserts that the basic qualities of
perceptual experience are not determined by, and thus do not reveal the natures of, basic properties in
the world. Part I argued that this conclusion follows from empirical results provided one assumes three
methodological principles. The empirical results concern the success of stimuli “inadequate” (atypical)
to an organ (e.g. pressure on the eyeball) in generating that organ’s characteristic sensory experiences (a
flash of color). The results themselves are incontrovertible, comprising frequently performed experiments,
easily checkable demonstrations, and publicly accessible facts. Mu¨ller moves beyond the incontrovertible
to the contentious when he presents these results as a double dissociation between external causes and
perceptual effects: the same cause may incite different effects when applied to the nerves of different
sensory organs, while the same sensory effect may be induced by radically different physical causes.
From this double dissociation, it follows immediately that sensory qualities are not identical to those of
their causes, and consequently that perceived qualities are not directly identifiable with the properties of
external objects.
I take there to be two contentious aspects to Mu¨ller’s argument. First, Mu¨ller’s conclusion that
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radically different physical causes may produce the “same” sensory effect requires some test of sameness
of sensation type.2 If sensations induced by adequate and inadequate stimuli are not sufficiently similar,
then the skeptical conclusion does not follow, as the realist may treat the two types of sensation as
different in epistemic status. For instance, if some characteristic is shared by all tastes due to adequate
stimuli, such as those of chocolate cake and beetroot, but not found in those due to inadequate stimuli,
e.g. the “taste” of a live battery on the tongue, then the realist may coherently insist that the well-defined
category of adequate taste sensations directly reveals external properties, while still acknowledging that
experiences due to inadequate stimuli, such as the battery “taste,” are opaque to the nature of their causes
(Gibson 1986, 246). I take Mu¨ller’s argument here to implicitly rely on two methodological principles.
The unitary correspondence principle legitimates inferences from nervous activity at the periphery to
downstream functional effects. The principle of comparability legitimates phenomenological claims about
whether two perceptual experiences are of the same type. Since these two principles are vindicated in
contemporary perceptual science, I take the double dissociation result to remain valid today.
Nevertheless, a prominent heterodox approach argues the atypical sensory phenomena that serve as
the empirical basis for the Doctrine are not relevant to a theory of perception proper. If this argument
is correct, and only those experiences induced by adequate stimuli are legitimate evidence in perceptual
science, then the double dissociation result, and so also the skeptical conclusion, may be avoided. This line
of argument was prominently advanced by ecological psychologist J. J. Gibson, who in turn has led many
naturalistically-inclined philosophers of perception to rest comfortable with the claim that we directly
perceive distal properties of the world. Mu¨ller explicitly addresses this worry when he argues that atypical
sensory situations, what he calls “subjective phenomena,” constitute the primary evidence for perceptual
science—his third methodological principle (Part I, Section 3.2). I defend Mu¨ller’s perspective, arguing
that Gibson’s considerations do not undermine the evidential import of atypical sensory phenomena,
nor the empirical status of the Doctrine, although they do have implications for the epistemology of
perception, that are addressed further below (Section 3.2).
2.1 The Unitary Correspondence Principle
One argument to the conclusion that radically different stimuli (light, pressure, electric shock) may all
produce the “same” type of sensation (e.g. a flash of color) rests on purely physiological considerations.
So long as their connectivity remains unchanged, nerve fibers in the lab behave the same regardless of
the manner of stimulation; consequently, we may safely assume the same sensory effect follows no matter
how a sensory nerve is stimulated, whether by typical or atypical stimuli. I call this the
Unitary Correspondence Principle – each (sensory) nerve fibre projects to a distinct location
in the brain and, when stimulated, always produces the same distinct effect.
Mu¨ller took something like this principle to serve as a necessary precondition for a science of neurophys-
iology, and employs it in arguing for the skeptical conclusion.3 In assessing the UCP today, we must be
2The other direction—from same physical cause to different sensory effects—is not contentious, because a single, token-
identical stimulus may induce multiple sensory effects, e.g. when the very same ray of light induces warmth on the skin and
brightness at the eye.
3An inverse UCP applies to motor nerves, namely same cerebral stimulation implies same motor effect at the periphery.
Mu¨lller uses this symmetry, and the analogy between motor and sensory nerves it establishes, extensively in reasoning
about the nervous system (1:617/612f ). He takes symmetry to follow from the Bell-Magendie Law: the anterior of the spine
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careful about the type of “effect” at issue. On the one hand, the idea that the same consciously accessible
effect follows whenever a particular nerve is stimulated is demonstrably false, as illustrated for instance
by the Necker cube, which changes in perceptible properties even as the incoming stimulus remains con-
stant. Conversely, if we understand the effects at issue as subpersonal and functionally defined, then this
principle may be found enshrined in the contemporary information processing approach to neuroscience.
The role of the UCP in Mu¨ller’s argument has been muddied by debate over how to interpret the
“energies” alluded to by the Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies. If these are special powers, fluids, or
activities distinctive of nerves associated with a particular sensory organ, as Mu¨ller sometimes seems to
indicate, then they could indeed play the relevant inferential role: a distinct, sensation-inducing physico-
chemical property, shared across all and only nerves of a particular sense modality, would license the
inference from the fact that some nerve of that modality has been stimulated to the conclusion that the
resulting sensation is of the same type as any other within the modality, no matter the nature of the
stimulus. Nevertheless, contemporary neuroscience does not recognize such special energies, and so it
would be damning if the reasoning of the Doctrine rested on this assumption. The 19th century followers
of Mu¨ller were split between this ontologically robust, physico-chemical interpretation of nerve energies
and a deflationary, informational reading, more in line with contemporary views. On the deflationary
side may be counted Mu¨ller’s doctoral students Helmholtz and Emil du Bois-Reymond; on the physico-
chemical, avowed intellectual disciples of Mu¨ller, Ernst Mach and Ewald Hering. Helmholtz and du
Bois-Reymond placed little emphasis on Mu¨ller’s talk of “energies,” emphasizing instead the importance
of the location in the brain to which sensory fibres project for determining phenomenal quality.4 In
contrast, Mach and Hering argued that only an ontological interpretation of the specific nerve energies
as distinct substances could perform the relevant explanatory role, i.e. explain why the qualities of the
senses differ, and that this crucial insight of Mu¨ller’s had been ignored or “suppressed even by [his] own
disciples” (Hering 1913, 28; cf. Mach 1896 [1885], v–vi, 193; Banks 2000, 106f ).
Part I argued that Mu¨ller himself was not committed to any specific ontology of nerve “energies,” but
rather that “energy” serves as a placeholder for unreduced, lawlike behavior. Law VII of the Doctrine
explicitly asserts ignorance about whether it is a special property of the nerves, or merely the brain
region to which they project, that determines sensory quality (Part I, Section 3.1). Mu¨ller’s physiological
argument to the skeptical conclusion does not rest, then, on any particular theory of nervous activity.
Rather, Mu¨ller’s reasoning draws on his methodological commitments. He recognized the need for a
principle upon which to ground inferences about the physiological structure of the nervous system from
contains only motor nerves and the posterior only sensory nerves; correspondingly, stimulation of nerves from the anterior
produces effects in the periphery (motor contraction), while stimulation of nerves from the posterior produces effects of
(apparent) sensation (typically of pain) in vivisection experiments. Since motor nerves have easily observable consequences
(muscle contractions), one can confirm experimentally that the same effect is produced whether they are stimulated by
mechanical, chemical, or electrical means: a motor nerve projecting to a frog’s thigh muscle produces a contraction whether
stimulated by scraping with a pin, shocking with electricity, applying a candle flame, or pouring on alkali. The ease with
which this unitary correspondence can be observed in the motor case provides, for Mu¨ller, support for the UCP as it applies
to sensory nerves.
4Emil du Bois-Reymond is perhaps most famous as the discoverer of the nerve action potential, work which, while
advancing our understanding of neural anatomy, also undermines the idea that nerves of different modalities have distinctive
characteristics—rather, for du Bois-Reymond, all nervous activity is fundamentally electrical. Nevertheless, he explicitly
endorsed Mu¨ller’s Doctrine, identifying distinctive sensory qualities with their associated Hirnprovinzen, or brain regions
(1874, 19). Helmholtz’s Zeichen, or “sign,” theory of nervous activity is discussed further below (Section 3.2); on this
view, the functional role that emerges from learned associations determines the character of sensation. While it is strictly
anachronistic to call these “information processing” views, they nevertheless presage the modern commitment to explain
nervous activity in terms of the transmission and transformation of symbols, distinguished by functional role rather than
intrinsic type.
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experiments at the periphery, arguing that such inferences would be impossible, and thus also a science
of nervous activity, unless one denies that nerve fibres anastomose, i.e. combine into larger branches as
blood vessels do.
If . . . the primitive fibres anastomose with each other in their course within the small fasciculi,
. . . then the cerebral extremity of a nervous fibril will be in relation with very many peripheral
points . . . no local impression on a single definite point would be perceived by the brain; for the
sensation of a single point evidently depends on the impression being conveyed by means of a
single fibre to a single point of the sensorium . . . The possibility of our establishing an accurate
theory of the action of the nerves rests wholly on the question of the primitive nervous fibres
anastomosing, or not. (1:606/600–1)
The very possibility of our “establishing an accurate theory” of nervous activity requires that anastomosis
be false. Assuming no anastomosis occurs allows us to draw inferences about the functional role played by
nerves in connecting the periphery of the body with the brain. Thus, the first clause of the UCP makes
an assertion about the structure of the nervous system, while the second adds the inference-licensing
claim that same (point) stimulation implies same effect. If we adopt these assumptions, then the double
dissociation follows: that the very same nerve fiber can be stimulated by both a battery and chocolate
cake implies that the very same (type of) effect is generated by both battery and cake, namely a taste.
This second clause of the UCP is the one that historically has been a matter of debate. If by “taste”
one means a consciously accessible sensory quality, then the arguments of the gestalt psychologists seem to
show this principle, which they dubbed the “constancy hypothesis,” is incorrect. They demonstrated that
point stimulations do not always generate the same sensory effect by drawing attention to phenomena
where point stimulations do not vary, yet sensory experience does, such as the spontaneous reversals
that occur while viewing a Rubin vase or Necker cube. Historically, the way to explain such phenomena
within the scope of the constancy hypothesis was by appeal to “unnoticed” primitive sensations that
presumedly stay constant across these reversals, and may be recovered through training and reflection.
Ko¨hler (1971 [1913]) demonstrated this strategy to be methodologically corrupt—any such theory is
trivially unfalsifiable, as apparent counterevidence may be summarily rejected as the result of insufficient
training or incompetent introspection (cf. Section 3.1).
However, we must be careful here to distinguish the claim that stimulation of a nerve fiber always
produces the same effect, from the stronger assertion that this effect corresponds directly to a sensation. If
one is interested in the functional role of subpersonal signals in sensory circuits, as is physiologist Mu¨ller,
then the weaker claim is sufficient to show the dissociation between external cause and sensory effect.
No matter how different the perceived “taste” of batteries and chocolate cake, insofar as they result from
stimulation of the same set of nerves, they must be treated as playing analogous informational roles within
the neural economy, on pain of abandoning neurophysiology as a science. Moreover, this subpersonal
reading of the UCP is essentially the basic tenet of the contemporary, “information processing” view:
neural signals participate in complex computations, but the nature of these computations is determined
wholely by local interactions; the upstream circumstances that produced the signal are irrelevant, only
the presence (or not) of the signal matters.
This line of reasoning has the desired implication, that sensations due to adequate and inadequate
stimuli are of the same epistemically-relevant type, only if one antecedently accepts that perceptual con-
tent is grounded in, or reduces to, the information content of the subvening neural processes; in other
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words, that personal-level knowledge attributions inherit their epistemic status from subpersonal phe-
nomena. For those who reject this reductionist project, a further argument is needed that the experiences
induced by inadequate stimuli are indeed of the same phenomenological type as those due to adequate
stimuli. Without this further argument, the double dissociation between sensations and stimuli, and
thus the skeptical conclusion, need not follow. While the needed additional principle is not explicitly
articulated by Mu¨ller, it nevertheless may be found as a fundamental methodological principle in the
practice of psychophysics.
2.2 The Principle of Comparability
Psychophysics measures the degrees of similarity and difference between personal-level, perceptual at-
tributes, and the extent to which these similarities and differences reflect physically specifiable features of
the stimulus. When studying color, for instance, stimuli may be colored lights, the spectral properties of
which can be precisely specified in physical terms. The output of an experiment is some form of behavior
that reveals a perceptual judgment, for instance, identifying two lights as “the same” in perceived color,
or ordering lights such that each is more similar in perceived color to its neighbors than to any others.
Several kinds of theoretical model may be derived from experiments such as this. On the one hand, one
can model internal relations between similar perceptual attributes, such as the familiar arrangement of
perceivable colors into a three-dimensional color solid. On the other hand, one may measure systematic
discrepancies between perceived qualities and their physical correlates—in the case of color, for instance,
the identification of metamers, physically different but perceptually indistinguishable color stimuli. Anal-
ogous methods may be used to model any perceptual property: pitch, weight, shape, smell, etc. (Stevens
1975; Clark 1993).
The core assumption behind these methods is that comparisons may be made with respect to the
sensory quality at issue. If subjects cannot make such comparisons, or if they attempt to do so, yet
produce inconsistent groupings or orderings, then the presumed sensory quality is not real. Consider,
for instance, the experience of “tonal volume,” or the perceived size or spatial extent of a sound (not to
be confused with “loudness,” the perceived intensity). Since simple auditory stimuli such as sine waves
are defined by just two parameters, frequency and amplitude, it would be surprising if they triggered
three distinct perceptual attributes: pitch, loudness, and volume. The debate on whether tonal volume
is indeed a real perceptual attribute turned largely on the question of whether subjects could make
consistent comparisons of stimuli with respect to volume. Some labs reported subjects making consistent
judgments of volume, ordering stimuli with respect to perceived volume in the same way as the experiment
was repeated. Other labs claimed subjects were confused by the instruction to attend to spatial extent of
auditory stimuli and were unable to compare different sounds with respect to volume at all (Isaac 2017).
I take it that the methods of psychophysics are coherent only on assumption of the
Principle of Comparability – two experiences are of the same perceptual type if and only if
comparisons between them of sameness, difference, and degree of similarity may be made
consistently.
The example of tonal volume illustrates how this principle may be applied to determine whether two
auditory experiences both instantiate the attribute of spatial extent. This method may be extended to
any case where one wonders whether two stimuli produce sensations of the same type. For instance, is
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“volume” perceived in the auditory modality the “same” sensory quality as volume perceived visually?
Psychophysics offers a principled means to answer this question, by asking subjects to make comparisons
of stimuli across the two domains; for instance: is this (auditorily presented) tone perceived as larger
or smaller in volume than this (visually presented) box? If subjects are able to make such judgments
consistently, then the qualities are of the same type.
If we accept the Principle of Comparability, the question whether perceived qualities due to adequate
stimuli and those due to inadequate stimuli are the same in type is strictly an empirical one. Is, for
instance, the “color” of afterimages the same type of property as the color of experiences due to ordinary
stimuli? If it is, then subjects should be able to make comparisons (for instance, matches) with respect
to color between both types of experience. As it happens, such comparisons are indeed possible. Most
psychophysical experiments simply assume that afterimages have “color” of the same sort as we perceive
from adequate stimuli, since they rely on subject reports of the color of afterimages using the same
vocabulary, i.e. my consistent ability to identify this afterimage as yellow and that as green demonstrates
that yellow and green are appropriate perceptual categories for analyzing them. Some experiments,
however, do rely on pure behavioral matching, for instance a study by Lier, Vergeer, and Anstis (2009),
where subjects matched adjustable sections of their monitor to perceived afterimages, thereby illustrating
that afterimage color and color due to adequate stimuli are indeed, from a psychophysical standpoint,
the same type of property.
The principle of comparability has the advantage of operationalizing the question of whether, given
any percept due to an inadequate stimulus, it is indeed of the same type as some set of percepts due to
adequate stimuli. Do the kinds of unusually induced percepts that serves as evidence for the Doctrine
pass this test? Unfortunately, experiments of the sort described for afterimages are either rare, or non-
existent, for some of the examples Mu¨ller found especially useful. Occasionally, this is due to practical or
ethical impediments. For instance, the claim that all sensory modalities may be stimulated by electrical
current is due to a set of late 18th century experiments by Volta and Ritter, in which the two investigators
independently shocked their sensory organs and reported their experiences. In the case of Ritter, there
is evidence that these experiments contributed to illness and early death, casting doubt on the wisdom
of reproducing them. Nevertheless, for many of the examples that Mu¨ller appeals to, formal experiment
seems unnecessary for establishing comparability. The warmth of sunlight on the skin is patently similar
in quality to warmth from friction; ringing due to tinnitus is clearly similar to, and often mistaken for,
distally caused ringings; etc.
So, the phenomenological claim that two sensory qualities are of the same type may be established by
testing whether they are consistently comparable. This is a foundational assumption of psychophysics,
as it continues to be practiced today. We should accept the unitary correspondence principle and the
principle of comparability because they are presuppositions of fruitful research programs for studying the
senses—to deny them is to reject neurophysiology and psychophysics as sources of empirical evidence.
Granting these two principles, the double dissociation between distal causes and sensory effects follows
quickly from the data, and upon its heels, the Doctrine’s skeptical conclusion.
Nevertheless, a prominent alternative to mainstream perceptual science rejects both reductionism and
the relevance of traditional psychophysics to phenomenology, a fortiori epistemology. Proponents of this
approach explicitly argue that it avoids the skeptical conclusion, allowing for a realism-friendly science
of perception. Mu¨ller’s final methodological principle speaks to their concerns.
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2.3 “Subjective” Phenomena
The first two methodological principles ground inferences in neurophysiology and psychophysics respec-
tively. The third principle concerns rather the evidential basis for the science of perception; Mu¨ller
asserts that “‘subjective’ phenomena” reveal the “true” activities of the senses, i.e. provide the evidence
that grounds any adequate perceptual science (Part 1, Section 3.2). While mainstream psychophysics
has sided with Mu¨ller on this point, the ecological psychology of J. J. Gibson explicitly rejects it, argu-
ing Mu¨ller’s subjective phenomena are of only secondary importance, relevant perhaps to neuroscience,
but not to a theory of perception proper. Here, I defend Mu¨ller’s evidential claim against this critique,
arguing subjective phenomena are fundamental to perceptual science—consequently, psychophysics inves-
tigates perception proper and, by the principle of comparability, the skeptical conclusion constitutes an
empirical result. This is a methodological point, however, and does not necessarily undermine Gibson’s
epistemological position, which we will return to below (Section 3.2).
By “subjective” phenomena, Mu¨ller means empirical effects involving both perceptions induced by
inadequate stimuli (pressure on the eye, a battery on the tongue), and those induced by adequate proximal
stimuli that do not correspond in the “usual” way to distal states of the world. Examples of the latter
sort include mirages, corona, phantom pains, and so-called perceptual illusions. Consider for instance an
example of great historical importance, the Purkinje effect: the inversion in relative saturation between
red and green regions of the spectrum in low light conditions, as when the same roses that appear a vivid,
deep red at noon appear relatively muddy and dim against richly green leaves at dusk. The stimulus
here, an illuminated rose, is adequate for color experience, yet the phenomenon is “subjective” in the
sense that the appearance of the rose changes while its objective properties remain stable. Psychophysics
investigates phenomena such as this by isolating aspects of sensation for comparison—for instance, one
might quantify the effect by asking subjects to match the red of the rose under each lighting condition
to standardized reference stimuli, such as Munsell color chips.
J. J. Gibson (1960; 1966; 1986) questioned the significance of experiments such as this, arguing
that psychologists should focus on perception as it occurs in realistic contexts. Traditional psychophysics
ignores the richness of the real world and the cues it provides, measuring instead isolated sensory qualities,
induced by artificial stimuli and contrived experimental setups. Mu¨ller’s subjective phenomena may only
be identified and described through such isolation and artifice—the hue of the afterimage only appears
of a kind with hues of ordinary surfaces when we unnaturally attend to circumscribed regions of the
visual field, ignoring its structured, holistic character. This focus on artificial, proximal, unusual, or
inadequate stimuli provides evidence for physiology, not psychology. Psychology proper “should try to
discover what an organism is responding to, not what excites all the little receptors” (Gibson 1960,
700). This means focussing on organisms as wholes and the kinds of stimuli to which they typically
respond, namely “stimulation that comes in a structured array and that changes over time” (Gibson
1986, 56). Unlike the isolated stimuli of traditional psychophysics, the rich, dynamic patterns of ambient
information in a real environment uniquely “specify” their source in a manner that organisms may
“pickup” (56–7). Epistemically, this ambient information directly conveys facts about distal objects to
perceptual experience, escaping the apparent skeptical trap inherent in subjective phenomena.
In order to confront the full force of Gibson’s critique, it is necessary to acknowledge just how radical
it is: Gibson’s claim is not merely that traditional psychophysics has focused on the wrong parts of experi-
ence or the environment, but rather that psychology needs to completely reconceptualize both experience
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and environment. As such, Gibson’s methodological claims are entangled with metaphysical ones—one
cannot meaningfully study perceptual experience by studying isolated sensory qualities because experi-
ence is not composed of such qualities, but is properly conceived as an irreducible dynamic whole (Gibson
1966, 2–5, 56). This metaphysical picture has direct epistemic implications: if perceptual experience is
not composed of simple sensations, then “sense impressions are not the ‘raw data’ of perception,” nor its
“given” (48).
Nevertheless, I want to set Gibson’s metaphysical position and its epistemic implications aside until
Section 3.2, and here focus solely on the question of evidence. Mu¨ller’s claim concerns which phenomena
are relevant to the science of perception, and it should stand or fall independent of any particular theo-
retical description or metaphysical analysis of those phenomena. While Gibson may choose to describe
phenomena such as afterimages or the Purkinje effect in very different terms than Mu¨ller, he does not
deny that they occur. Rather, he denies that such phenomena reveal anything pertinent to the under-
standing of perception proper, namely our ability to extract invariants from ambient information in the
environment (Gibson 1986, 238–250). This is because phenomena such as corona and afterimages “do not
seriously interfere with the getting of information . . . They only distract the attention from the register-
ing of objective facts” (Gibson 1966, 306). Do these considerations undermine the claim that subjective
phenomena are of primary evidential importance for a science of perception?
The mainstream view attributes importance to subjective phenomena in part for the very reason
Gibson rejects it, namely the role they play in revealing the details of underlying mechanism. For
instance, Helmholtz stresses that perceptual “illusions” are scientifically important precisely because, by
forcing a breakdown in the veridicality of sensory experience, they probe the process by which veridicality
is typically achieved. Consequently, such “illusions” should not be understood as indicative of any error
in the mechanism of perception, which proceeds as always; rather, they illuminate this mechanism truly:
[W]hen the modes of stimulation of the organs of sense are unusual, incorrect ideas of ob-
jects are apt to be formed; which used to be described, therefore, as illusions of the senses.
Obviously, in these cases there is nothing wrong with the activity of the organ of sense and
its corresponding nervous mechanism which produces the illusion. Both of them have to act
according to the laws that govern their activity once for all. It is rather simply an illusion
in the judgment of the material presented to the senses, resulting in a false idea of it. (1962
[1910], 4)
While “illusory” phenomena may not typically interfere with veridical perception of environmental fea-
tures, they may still reveal how typical information pickup occurs—insofar as typical information pickup
is the target of a theory of perception proper, then even Gibson should be interested in subjective phe-
nomena and treat them as a primary source of evidence, a point made forcefully by Shepard (1981):
To say that there is sufficient information in the proximal stimulus and even to point to some
of the higher-order variables in which the requisite information resides is not to describe the
mechanism that extracts that information and uses it to control appropriate behavior or ad-
ditional cognitive processing. That the perceptual system is governed by internalized rules
becomes evident under those “impoverished” circumstances in which the proximal stimulation
fails to contain sufficient information for the unique determination of the three-dimensional
scene . . . The perceptual system is not simply transparent to the incident stimulation. The
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inner machinery that underlies its selectivity in the face of greatly reduced external informa-
tion does not simply go away when the conditions of observation improve. . . . Under normal
circumstances, our perceptual system . . . gives rise to the illusion of transparency . . . ; but it
is only an illusion. (Shepard 1981, 285–6)
Now, if this line of response to Gibson concerned only the investigation of subpersonal aspects of
perception, then it would fail—Gibson is happy to acknowledge the value of traditional psychophysics
for uncovering facts about the neurophysiological mechanisms of sensation. But the “laws” of neural
mechanism which Helmholtz and Shepard invoke are not only subpersonal, they are reflected also in
law-like constraints on the phenomenology of perception: what it is like to have a particular experience,
and consequently also the epistemic implications of such experiences. It is these law-like patterns in
phenomenal experience that psychophysics discovers, and it is precisely their law-like character that
allows them to serve as evidence for underlying sensory mechanisms. Insofar as subjective phenomena
probe in the first instance the personal-level features of perceptual experience, though, it seems they must
be acknowledged as a significant source of evidence for theories of perception proper.5
To see this, consider for instance the case of afterimages. Gibson is correct that afterimages rarely
interfere with our effective perception of or navigation through natural environments; likewise, they have
been an important source of evidence on the physiology of color vision. But afterimages are also an
important source of evidence for theories of the phenomenology of color experience. In the late 19th
century, careful introspective analysis of afterimages inspired Hering’s opponent model of the space of
possible color sensations. The oppositions between blue and yellow, and green and red, that motivate
opponent color theory could only be derived from a careful examination of “subjective” sensations, since
these oppositions simply do not exist in the external correlates of color. Yet opponent color theory is
manifestly a theory about what the experience of colors is like, and which combinations of colors are
phenomenologically possible—it predicts and, if correct, explains why greenish red is not a possible color
experience, yet yellowish red is. Likewise, the Purkinje effect provides evidence about low-light receptors,
but it also describes a law-like regularity in our visual experience of a dynamic environment. Similar
considerations apply to all of Mu¨ller’s subjective phenomena.
So, subjective phenomena constitute a source of evidence on phenomenal regularities, and thus on
perception proper. By their nature, as phenomena occurring when perceptions differ from the “usual”
case, or varying with observer’s perspective as stimulus remains constant, these experiences do not reveal
the intrinsic qualities of their physical causes; consequently, to accept them as evidence is to acknowledge
the empirical basis for the Doctrine’s skeptical conclusion. It is worth stressing, however, that this is
meant as an inclusive point, not an exclusive one. I reject Gibson’s negative argument, against the
relevance of subjective phenomena to perceptual science proper, but I do not mean to undermine his
positive project, to study perceptual experience in the context of rich, dynamical cues. Notice that
the paradigmatic examples we’ve considered to motivate Mu¨ller’s position involve color, a quality on
5This does not address Gibson’s statistical point: that subjective phenomena are rarely attended to, or rarely interfere
with veridical perception. I take it that these statistical considerations are not relevant to the evidential question addressed
here—a comprehensive science should explain even very rare phenomena (although I think the rarity of subjective phenomena
has been overstated). Rather, I think they are intended to support Gibson’s metaphysical and epistemological views.
Nevertheless, when addressing those views below, I will focus on Gibson’s idea that we directly perceive structured aspects
of the environment, rather than his statistical claims; this is because I think structuralist arguments support a much
stronger epistemological position than mere statistical regularity—see Section 3.3, below, and Part I, Section 3.2, for
further discussion.
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which Gibson had little to say. In contrast, Gibson’s view is motivated largely from considering spatial
perception. In fact, for Mu¨ller, as for Gibson, there are important epistemic differences between color and
spatial perception, differences on which they largely agree—a point that will become clear as we examine
the philosophical implications of these empirical results.
3 Naturalistic Epistemology of Perception
So, by the lights of the science of perception, the qualities we perceive are not determined by, and so do
not directly reveal, the properties of their external causes. May we nevertheless attain some knowledge
of the world, or does this “skeptical conclusion” open the floodgates to global skepticism? Both Mu¨ller
and Helmholtz argue that the Doctrine is compatible with a form of realism, namely epistemic structural
realism—the view that we may know relations that obtain between properties and objects in the world,
while remaining ignorant of their intrinsic natures. Contemporary philosophy of perception offers a more
fertile field for realist strategies than the landscape with which Mu¨ller and Helmholtz were familiar;
nevertheless, this section argues that, for a broad class of naturalistic attitudes, structuralism still poses
the most promising route to perceptual realism.
Naturalists hold that philosophy should cohere somehow with the scientific worldview. More specific
naturalisms vary widely, from those that eschew scientific detail, focusing instead on intuitively non-
supernatural metaphysics, to those that defer completely to the sciences, endeavoring to read the solutions
to philosophical problems directly off current theory. For the present purposes, I will restrict attention
to naturalisms that take themselves beholden to the details of current science, distinguishing two broad
attitudes, which I’ll call weak and strong naturalism. Weak naturalism demands merely that philosophical
theory be consistent with scientific ontology, while strong naturalism demands further that the ontology
of philosophy be identical to that of science.
To see why the distinction matters, consider, for instance, the psychophysical result that colors due to
inadequate stimuli (e.g. afterimages) and those due to adequate stimuli (illuminated surfaces) are of the
same phenomenal type. If one is a strong naturalist, then one is forced to acknowledge that there is no
empirically motivated difference in kind between these experiences, and consequently, one can make no
appeal to such a difference in solving epistemological problems of color perception. Conversely, the weak
naturalist may feel comfortable stipulating they are of different ontic, a fortiori epistemic, types—such
a distinction could not be defended within perceptual science, but stipulating it is consistent with that
science, in the sense that it adds no new objects to the world, but merely re-categorizes those already
on offer. Weak naturalists are thus at liberty to draw new distinctions, or re-prioritize the objects and
events of perceptual science, in ways that strong naturalists are forbidden.
For the strong naturalist, the defense of realism has turned largely on questions about the nature of
the mechanism leading from sensory stimulation to conscious experience. One issue here is whether this
mechanism performs an inference. If so, then it would seem that our perceptual knowledge of the world
may only be as justified as the conclusions of any instance of that inference type—a worrisome result
should perceptual experience be generated by an inductive or abductive inference. Second, following
Gibson, some philosophers have put much weight on the role of action and active engagement with
the world in determining perceptual experience; the intuition is that perception-action loops serve to
distinguish adequate from inadequate sensations, as only the adequate ones successfully guide action. As
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usual, Helmholtz is at the center of both these issues; surveying the state of the art reveals few alternatives
for the strong naturalist to Helmholtz-style structuralism.
The section concludes by returning to the position of the weak naturalist. While she is at liberty to
ground perceptual knowledge in simple sensory qualities, this move leaves perceptual knowledge far more
coarse-grained than the richness of our experience. Thus, even the weak naturalist should find structural
realism an appealing response to the Doctrine’s skeptical challenge.
3.1 The Question of Inference
If the skeptical conclusion of the Doctrine is correct, and basic sensations do not directly reveal their
causes, how do we nevertheless form a stable and effective perceptual picture of the world? Helmholtz
argued that perception results from an inductive, or analogical, inference: from our past experience of
associations between primitive sensations, we infer the most likely distal causes. Helmholtz took these
inferences to be analogous to those performed in science, and thus our perceptual experiences to be
“conclusions,” every bit as defeasible as the conclusions of science (Helmholtz 1962 [1910], Section 26).
If this view is correct, and our perceptual experience is a defeasible hypothesis constructed through
association, analogy, or induction, then it appears that perceptual “knowledge” of the world may be
sparse at best, and impossible at worst.
The next subsection will elaborate on Helmholtz’s own solution to this worry. Here, I want to dis-
entangle three issues that have been conflated in the debate over perceptual inference: (i) the empirical
question of what mechanism leads from peripheral sensory stimulation to full-blown perceptual experi-
ence; (ii) the methodological question of whether it is constructive to emphasize an analogy between the
unconscious perceptual processes that result in experience and conscious inference of the kind we see in
scientific reasoning; and (iii) the logical question of the evidentiary relationship between the input and
output of a perceptual process. I’ll tackle these issues in reverse order.
My own view is that Helmholtz should be read as making a claim about the logical structure of
perception. Any input–ouput process for which one can assign a semantic interpretation to both input
and output may be treated as a form of argument, with the input serving as premises and the output as
conclusion. Argument-types may be categorized through the schematic relationship that obtains between
premises and conclusion (Peirce 1955 [1883]). For instance, an inductive argument takes as input the
constant conjunction between two properties, or an object and a property, and delivers a rule about their
relationship; in contrast, a (simple) deductive argument takes as premises a rule and antecedent to that
rule, delivering as conclusion its consequent. The logical structure of a process is the schematic argument
profile instantiated by its inputs and outputs.6
If one accepts the Doctrine’s skeptical conclusion, then the input to a perceptual process is information
about the state of sensory nerves. If the output of this process is a rich experience of a distal world,
then at the very least, we know the logical structure of that process is ampliative, and this in turn tells
us something about the degree of evidential support that obtains between the stimulus that instigates
perception and the culminating experience of it. If one takes this evidential relation to be relevant for
the epistemology of perception, then it follows from its ampliative character that our experiences of the
6Helmholtz identifies a “new sense impression” as the “minor premiss” and a learned association between sensations as
the “major premiss” of a perceptual inference, which itself exemplifies “an elementary process lying at the foundation of
everything properly termed thought” (1977 [1878], 132; cf. 1962 [1910], 24–7).
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world have the same, defeasible epistemic status as the conclusions of an ampliative argument in, say,
the sciences (cf. Peirce 1955 [c.1902]). I take Helmholtz to be motivated by considerations of this form
when he argues that perception is analogous to scientific reasoning, and that this conclusion is relevant
for the empistemology of perception.
This logical question is distinct from the physiological one: what mechanism generates perceptual
experience from sensory input? If this mechanism may be interpreted as the manipulation of representa-
tions, i.e. bearers of content, then we may ask whether it follows steps that mirror the structure of any
particular type of argument. This argument may differ in logical structure from that we ascribed merely
by looking at the inputs and outputs. For instance, the inputs to a process may include enough informa-
tion to derive the output deductively, but the internal mechanism may fail to utilize that information, and
instead derive the output through an inductive procedure. Conversely, a problem that appeared to have
the logical structure of an induction may be solved through a deductive mechanism, if that mechanism
employs a hidden, but independently justified, premise. For instance, it may appear that perception of
a red apple as ripe and comestible must be the result of an induction over past experiences of redness
and their association with edibility; however, if the mechanism leading from sensed redness to perceived
edibility draws on an evolutionarily instilled rule, that bright redness implies edibility, for instance, then
it may derive the output deductively.
Absent a theory of perceptual mechanisms, the strong naturalist might take the logical structure
of perception to serve as a guide to its epistemology. I don’t think this epistemic maneuver is under-
mined in any serious way by early worries about the inference view, for instance that of Ko¨hler (1971
[1913]) discussed above (Section 2.1). In his attack on the constancy hypothesis, Ko¨hler attacked the
appeal not only to unnoticed sensations, but also to unconscious inferences. But this is a methodological
criticism—Helmholtz’s inference view is not permissible as an empirical theory of perception, since it
posits unconscious states that may be redescribed or stubbornly reasserted in response to any putative
criticism, rendering the theory unfalsifiable by consciously accessible means. This is essentially a point
about the relationship between evidence and theory in psychophysics, not about physiology or episte-
mology. Rather, the epistemological point rests only on an ability to ascribe content to the input to
perceptual processes, and this may be done by appeal to the physiology of perception, independent of
considerations about what is noticed or conscious from a phenomenological or psychophysical perspective.
More recent critics of the inference view have focused on disanalogies between perceptual processes
and prototypical inferences. Some of these disanalogies undercut the logical claim, others the mechanistic
claim, and some both. For instance, if one takes typical inferences to be entirely conscious, then the
unconscious nature of putative perceptual inference is a point of disanalogy. This disanalogy might
imply that thinking of perception as inference will not be helpful for discovering its mechanism—again,
a methodological point. Conversely, the disanalogy may pose problems for the logical claim, if one
takes it that unconscious mental states may not be assigned propositional content. Finally, if one holds
that only conscious states are relevant to epistemology, then the logical structure of perception will be
deemed irrelevant for questions of knowledge. Kaplan (2002) for instance, moves from the last of these
considerations to the first (cf. Hamlyn 1977); Hatfield (2002) stresses both the first and the second; while
Rock (1983) defends the inference view against arguments from disanalogy.
While the methodological side of this question is important, and not constrained in any interesting
way by the Doctrine, the most important issues about perceptual inference for today’s strong naturalist
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concern the candidate mechanisms for perceptual processing. For, unlike the time of Helmholtz, there
are a number of concrete, well-specified candidate mechanisms available, and thus one may analyze their
epistemic implications directly rather than relying on mere logical analysis of the problem of perception.
Whether or not one accepts the principled worries that perceptual processes are disanalogous to prototyp-
ical inference, a number of the proposed mechanisms appear to be explicitly inferential. This is because
they employ the mathematics of Bayesianism, and this mathematics is typically discussed, and indeed
was first proposed, as a form of inference.7 Confronting the empirical success of these models, the strong
naturalist would be unwilling to accept the attitude of Kaplan (2002), who simply denies that Bayesian
models are appropriate for perception a priori. Rather the more appropriate naturalistic question is:
given that perceptual processes are best modeled by Bayesian mathematics, what does that tell us about
the epistemology of perception?
A nice example of this kind of debate is the recent exchange between Andy Clark (2017a, 2017b) and
Jakob Hohwy (2016, 2017). Clark and Hohwy are both proponents of the predictive processing (PP)
framework in cognitive science. PP posits the nervous system is structured in a hierarchy of Bayesian
models, each predicting the behavior of the one below. A Bayesian model begins with a prior probability
distribution over a set of elements, typically described as “events” or “worlds”; then, given some input
set of events (or partial reassignment of probabilities, Jeffrey 1965) it updates the probability distribution
to a posterior set of values by Bayes’ rule. Bayesian models such as this are commonly used to analyze
scientific inference (Shimony 1970; Howson and Urbach 2006); furthermore, introductions to PP routinely
cite Helmholtz’s inferential view as a precursor, and present the view as continuing or reviving his insights
into the inferential nature of perception.
Both Hohwy and Clark take perception to be inferential in some Helmholtzian way, yet draw very
different epistemological conclusions. Hohwy defends the reactionary view that the inferential character of
perception implies a veil of uncertainty separates our experience from the world, perception is indirect, and
thus we should embrace some variety of skepticism. In contrast, Clark takes the inferential character of
the PP model to be counterbalanced by considerations of embodiment and active exploration, opening the
door to a direct realist epistemology of perception—this response bears more resemblance to Helmholtz’s
own than is typically recognized, and I elaborate on it in the following subsection. At least two further
responses are possible, however.
One response is to apply the worries of Hatfield and Hamlyn directly to the mechanism of PP,
arguing that low-level Bayesian processes are not in fact inferential, since their status as unconscious,
or subpersonal, blocks the attribution of content, and content attributions are required for a process
to be identified as inferential. I think there is something that this criticism gets right: namely, we
should distinguish the mathematics of Bayesianism from the interpretation of that mathematics. The
fact that Bayesian mathematics provides an empirically adequate model for some neural mechanism
does not thereby imply that the interpretation of that mathematics as involving inferences over sets of
worlds and their respective degrees of possibility follows as well (cf. Bruineberg, Kiverstein, and Rietveld
2016). Consider, for instance, the synchronization of weakly coupled oscillators, a mathematical model
that applies to a variety of phenomena, such as the ticking of clocks attached to the same wall, or the
pulsing light of fireflies in the same bush; no conclusions whatsoever may be drawn about functional
or semantic similarities across these divers oscillations from the mere fact that they satisfy the same
7For a relatively early survey and exposition, see Knill and Richards 1996.
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model—mathematic structure simpliciter determines neither ontology nor epistemology. Ultimately, the
question of how to interpret the mathematics of PP must be resolved within that research program, and
while empirically-engaged philosophers are part of this discussion, the epistemic implications can only be
assessed after that debate is resolved.
A final, more pertinent response is exemplified by Drayson (2017), who argues that the physiological /
psychological question of whether perception exhibits an inferential structure may be completely detached
from epistemic considerations. I take this move to exemplify weak naturalism, and return to it in
Section 3.3.
3.2 The Answer from Action
While interpretations of Helmholtz’s epistemology range from idealism (Heidelberger 1995), through
Friedman’s (1997) transcendental empiricism, to realism (McDonald 2002), I read him as an epistemic
structural realist (as have others, e.g. Moulines 1981; Hatfield 1990, 2018). Part I argued that Mu¨ller’s own
response to the Doctrine was a form of structural realism, but Mu¨ller and Helmholtz differ substantively
in the motivations for their structuralism. Mu¨ller’s structuralism was motivated largely by his Herbartian
theory of the mechanism of concept formation (Part I, Section 2). While Helmholtz was also influenced by
Herbart (Lenoir 2006; Isaac 2013), he was more reticent than Mu¨ller in his assumptions about cognitive
mechanisms. Rather, I take Helmholtz’s structural realism to follow from the constitutive role he saw for
action in determining perceptual content (a role nascent in Mu¨ller, see Part I, Section 3.2). By including
active exploration as part of the mechanism of perception, Helmholtz is able to mitigate the epistemic
worries introduced by the observation that the logical structure of perception is inferential, and restore
a form of perceptual realism. There are close analogs here to the view of the archetypal direct realist,
Gibson, as well as to those of philosophers who have followed in his stead (e.g. Noe¨ 2004; Chemero 2009;
and Clark’s 2016 embodied PP). The most convincing interpretation of their action-centric arguments
does not imply stable access to simple properties in the world, but rather epistemically robust (“direct”)
access only to those structural relationships that hold between such properties—an epistemic position in
agreement with Helmholtz on the question of what can be known, and in that sense consistent with the
Doctrine’s skeptical conclusion.
A classic worry in perceptual science has been the underdetermination problem: the proximal infor-
mation available to sensory surfaces at any moment underdetermines its distal causes. For instance, a
square-shaped visual sensation underdetermines the shape of the object that cast it, since an infinite
number of differently shaped and sized quadrilaterals may all cast the same square-shaped projection on
the retina if suitably arranged. Likewise, a sound heard at particular loudness and pitch underdetermines
its cause, which may be distant and very loud, or close and relatively soft. If one acknowledges underde-
termination, it appears to drive one to inferentialism: since our immediate experience does not provide
definitive evidence for the properties of the stimulus, we may at best infer them.
Gibson (1986) rejected the claim that the information available to sensory systems underdetermines
distal causes. He argued that the underdetermination worry rests on a mischaracterization of the stimu-
lus. In general, our sensory systems do not receive static information that underdetermines distal causes;
rather, we receive dynamic patterns of information that “uniquely specify” distal causes in the envi-
ronment (74). For instance, if we move our head or body, then we disambiguate the many possible
quadrilaterals that might cast a square projection on the retina; if we turn our head, we disambiguate,
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through subtle changes in reverberatory properties, near from far sound sources. In general, once we
recognize that perceivers move and actively explore their environment, then we see that the information
available to them is dynamic and structured, changing in systematic ways over time.8 If Gibson is right,
and these structured, temporally extended patterns of information in the environment uniquely specify
their distal causes, then there is no principled barrier to our perceptual systems providing us with direct
access to those causes in the world (47–92).
Although Gibson explicitly presents this view as contrasting with that of Helmholtz, I think a closer
comparison reveals that, while their metaphysics of perception may differ greatly, the epistemological
implications of their positions are closely aligned. Helmholtz held a “sign” (Zeichen) theory of perception,
on which our experiences come in an innately determined vocabulary of arbitrary symbols—colors for
vision, pitches for audition, pressures for touch, etc. (Helmholtz 1977 [1878]; Hatfield 1990, 208–11). This
minimal innateness hypothesis builds naturally on the Doctrine’s conclusion: if basic sensory qualities
are determined in the first instance by the activity of our nerves (rather than their distal causes), it
makes sense that these qualities be somehow innately constrained. Nevertheless, arbitrary symbols are
not yet bearers of content, they are merely potential bearers of content. These symbols come to serve
as signs for external properties through experience, but they must be understood as mere signs, rather
than “images” (Abbilder), since they bear no similarity to the properties they indicate (Helmholtz 1977
[1878], 121–2).
What additional ingredients are needed to imbue these innate symbols with content? Helmholtz’s
epistemology requires two. The first is the causal law, an assumption of regularity in the relationship
between sensory signs and their distal causes, i.e. a kind of “law of lawfulness” (Hatfield 1990, 211).
The causal law allows us to infer distinctions and invariants in the properties of the world from changes
and stabilities in experience, and thereby bootstrap our way to an understanding of physical laws. It
thus serves the role of a transcendental principle, one without which coherent experience itself would
be impossible, and upon which science is grounded. Debates over exactly where Helmholtz should be
positioned on the spectrum from realism to idealism turn significantly on questions about his evolving
attitude toward this causal law; in particular, whether or not it implies realism about causality per se,
and whether it may be justified transcendentally or must be accepted without justification.9
I will return to the causal law in Section 4; here, I want to grant the causal law and explore the best
case scenario for an epistemology of perception consistent with the Doctrine. For this we need to turn
attention to the second ingredient Helmholtz requires to imbue signs with content: action. For, if the
casual law allows us to infer features of the world from changes in our sensory signs, it can only do so
in conjunction with a process for generating such changes or invariants. Here, Helmholtz takes volitional
8Movement is not the only factor contributing to the disambiguation of stimuli: for instance bilateral disparity (not
just between eyes, but also ears, nostrils, etc.) is a feature of sensory systems that typically operates to greatly reduce
the potential for ambiguity in the proximal stimulus. Nevertheless, binocular vision by itself does not resolve the visual
underdetermination problem, as the identical appearance of convex busts lit from above and concave masks lit from below
demonstrates. In general, from a mathematical standpoint, static sensations will never uniquely specify their distal cause,
a result that Gibson held to be irrelevant for understanding perception in an ecological context. I set this issue aside here
in order to focus on the positive role of action in veridical perception. For a concise exchange in this debate, see e.g. the
dispute over the relevance of the Ames Room illusion to Gibson’s claims (Gehringer and Engel 1986; Runeson 1988).
9For some subtle articulations of various positions within this debate, see Friedman (1997), Patton (2009), and Hatfield
(2011). My own view is that Helmholtz’s texts sufficiently underdetermine his exact position that a variety of readings are
possible. However, the point of the discussion here is not to defend any particular, detailed interpretation of Helmholtz,
but rather, taking inspiration from the rough concordance between his action–structure view and Gibson’s, to motivate
structuralism as the most promising route to realism compatible with the Doctrine.
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action10 to serve as the critical mechanism for producing the patterns of sensory signs that provide access
to the external world. Voluntary movements allow, in the first instance, a differentiation between subject
and object by revealing a distinction between sensations that change systematically with willed motion
and those that do not.11 The more specific problem, of determining the distal cause of some particular
sensation, is likewise resolved through movement, for we gain knowledge about distal objects by actively
varying our perspective upon them (Helmholtz 1962 [1910], 31–2; Helmholtz 1977 [1878], 125). While the
“certainty” so obtained is tempered by the inferential structure of the logic of perception, and thus of a
piece with scientific (un)certainty, it nevertheless constitutes a robust form of knowledge as it is grounded
in “experimentation”:
The same great importance which experiment has for the certainty of our scientific convictions
it has also for the unconscious inductions of the perceptions of the senses. It is only by
voluntarily bringing our organs of sense in various relations to the objects that we learn to be
sure as to our judgments of the causes of our sensations. (Helmholtz 1962 [1910], 30–1)
Spontaneously and by our own power, we vary some of the conditions under which the object
has been perceived. We know that the changes thus produced in the way that objects look
depend solely on the movements we have executed. Thus we obtain a different series of
apperceptions of the same object, by which we can be convinced with experimental certainty
that they are simply apperceptions, and that it is the common cause of them all. (31)
The causal law is needed here to posit the object in the first instance (that there is some cause to the
systematicity in our experience), but having granted this, the invariant pattern in our experiences itself
constitutes what we can know about this object, with experimental certainty.
In such passages, Helmholtz appears to invoke exactly the same considerations as Gibson, yet to derive
a very different conclusion. Recognizing the power of action to disambiguate stimuli, Gibson concluded
that perception was direct and non-inferential; acknowledging this same power, Helmholtz re-affirms
the indirect and inferential character of perception. This apparent contradiction is resolved once we
recognize the profound qualitative difference between classic examples of underdetermination, such as
underdetermination of shape or location, and the underdetermination posed by the skeptical conclusion
of the Doctrine. For the skeptical conclusion concerns the most geometrically primitive, basic, or simple
qualities of experience: colors, pitches, smells, etc. Yet shape and location are neither primitive nor
basic in this sense: visual shapes are composed of complexes of colors, arranged systematically. Likewise,
locations are not basic, but relative positions within a rich, extended spatial array. Helmholtz asserts
that knowledge of these rich structural properties is possible, while denying any access to simple or ba-
sic properties in the world. This structuralism emerges in his careful exposition of spatial perception,
whereby “sensation aggregates” (Empfindungsaggregat) are the evidential basis for “spatial relationships”
(Raumbeziehung), such as being “side by side” (Nebeneinander); in general, it is “sequences” or “order-
ings” (Reihenfolge) of sensations that bear knowledge—not sensations themselves, which alone are mere
“signs,” devoid of distal content (Helmholtz 1977 [1878], 125–7; cf. Helmholtz 1962 [1910], 22, 24).
10The critical role for volitional action in Helmholtz has been extensively elaborated and defended in recent work by De
Kock (2014a, 2014b, 2018), who has provided inspiration for the discussion here. De Kock has emphasized this feature of
Helmholtz as part of a broader project exploring the extent to which Helmholtz was inspired by Fichte, an issue on which
I do not wish to commit myself; for an alternative view, see Hatfield (2018).
11Shades of this view may be found in Mu¨ller, who explicitly argues that the movements that bring about these distinctions
are first initiated within the womb (2:268/1080).
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Returning now to Gibson, does he pretend to offer more than this—does his argument from active
exploration to direct epistemic access subsume the geometrically simple or basic properties of the world?
I think the answer is no—Gibson’s arguments at best recover direct access to the very same structural
properties that Helmholtz believes we may access with experimental certainty. The disagreement between
the two does not concern which aspects of the world we may know, but rather the nature of the justification
for that knowledge. Gibson endorses a radically non-reductionist metaphysics of perception that allows
him to assert perception of structure does not depend on prior sensation of simple properties, and thus
may be non-inferential.
That Gibson, like Helmholtz, takes perceptual knowledge to concern structural aspects of the world
is revealed in his considered notion of environmental information; Gibson is explicit that the information
relevant to perception is not the Shannon variety, but rather “information considered as structure” (1966,
245, cf. 208). Consequently, when describing the perception of distal properties, he invariably employs
structural or relational terminology: “A surface is seen when the array has structure, that is differences
in different directions” (1986, 151). Likewise, size perception occurs when “certain invariant ratios”
(relations of relative length, etc.) are “picked up” (160), and perception of extension into the distance
relies on “gradients of density” (163), i.e. spatially distributed trajectories of change in appearance. For
prototypical simple qualities, such as color, Gibson does not defend direct access to them considered in
isolation—such isolate colors are mere “useless dimensions of sensitivity” (1966, 183). However, structural
relationships between colors do have epistemic import:
[T]rue relative colors of the adjacent surfaces emerge as the lighting changes . . . From an
ecological point of view, the color of a surface is relative to the colors of adjacent surfaces: it
is not an absolute color. Its reflectance ratio is specified only in relation to other reflectance
ratios of the layout. (1986, 89, 91)
Insofar as colors convey information about the chemical properties of surfaces, this again is only done
in a structural way, through changes or relations between colors rather than absolute color values, as
when “greening” indicates “increase in chlorophyll” (98). This point has been lost on disciples such as
Noe¨ (2004), who mistakenly attributes to Gibson the view that “ripeness” may be perceived through
color (124), rather than (as I read him) that change in the degree of ripeness, a structural rather than
simple quality, may be perceived through a change in color.
For Gibson, this structural knowledge is not obtained inferentially; rather, perceptual mechanisms
directly access invariant structural features of the environment through “information pickup” or “reso-
nance” (1966, Ch. 13; 1986, Ch. 14). In endorsing this view, Gibson rejects the traditional idea that
perceptual experience is composed of, derived from, or based on simple, punctate parts in either space
or time. Spatial experience is not composed of point color sensations (53–7), temporal experience is not
composed of “momentary patterns” (254). Composition here implies in the first instance a claim about
perceptual mechanisms: contra received lore, perceptual experience is not the result of a piecemeal pro-
cess that begins with surface receptor firing, it occurs holistically as part of a fluid dynamic interaction
with the environment.12 A stronger reading takes Gibson to defend a metaphysical thesis as well: the
12Gibson himself did not propose a specific mechanism for perception (hence the critical remarks of Shepard, above), and
there is yet no consensus on a single, viable candidate amongst ecological psychologists. Nevertheless, progress been made:
Runeson (1977), for instance, gives some suggestive remarks and a proof of concept for the kind of “smart mechanisms”
Gibson needs; following in his footsteps van de Grind has developed “smart,” or “non-computational,” models of sensori-
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holistic, structural features of experience are ontologically primary, while fragmentary, circumscribed fea-
tures are derivative, or supervene on them—by slight abuse of terminology from philosophy of science, we
might call this an ontic structural realism.13 This reading makes sense of some of Gibson’s more cryptic
claims, for instance, that scanned information “contains the scene . . . it does not have to be converted
into one” (1966, 262), that “the perception of the layout, the shadowing, and the reflectance of surfaces
are mutually dependent” (215), or that perception is “sensationless” (2) and thus “[w]e do not perceive
stimuli” (1986, 55). Nevertheless, this strong metaphysical reading of Gibson does not contradict the
skeptical conclusion—it does not assert that our experience of simple qualities reveals the intrinsic nature
of simple properties in the world—rather, it rejects the claim that we typically perceive simple qualities
at all, or that they hold any epistemic significance.
So, adding action to the mechanisms of perception allows one to achieve structural knowledge of
the world. This epistemic structural realism is agreed upon by both the paradigmatic (pro-Doctrine)
inferentialist Helmholtz and the paradigmatic (anti-Doctrine) direct realist Gibson. Where they disagree
is in the justification for this structural knowledge: for Helmholtz it is derived inferentially from simple
sensations, and at best on par with experimental certainty; for Gibson, structure is picked up directly,
and not composed of simple sensations, consequently permiting an even more robust realism. Whether
she endorses an inferentialist or a direct resonance mechanism, then, the strong naturalist should respond
to the skeptical conclusion by adopting a structuralist epistemology.
3.3 A Dilemma for Naturalistic Foundationalism
While the epistemology of the strong naturalist is heavily constrained by the details of perceptual science,
that of the weak naturalist is more autonomous. In particular, the weak naturalist need not take the
psychology of perception to determine in any way which states are epistemically basic. From this perspec-
tive, one might hold that the mechanism of perception is inferential, yet the epistemology of perception
is not; for instance, if only consciously accessible states and processes are taken to serve an epistemic
role. Proponents of this approach typically take geometrically basic perceptual qualities, such as colors
and pitches, to be epistemically basic. Yet this strategy must accept widespread error in the ground
for perceptual knowledge, a dismaying outcome greatly mitigated by taking structural relations to be
epistemically basic, as these enjoy much broader domains of invariance. Thus, even the weak naturalist
should adopt some form of epistemic structural realism.14
The idea that the epistemology of perception may be autonomous from the science or metaphysics
of perception is surveyed by Lyons, who presents it as a form of “modest foundationalism.” The idea is
that (some) perceptual beliefs may be taken as epistemically basic, i.e. requiring no justification. On this
view, the unconscious mechanisms that produce perceptual states are irrelevant to the epistemic status of
these states, whether or not these mechanisms are inferential, precisely because they are unconscious. It
is only conscious beliefs that participate in processes of reasoning and justification, perceptual beliefs are
not derived by any such processes from other beliefs, but revealed directly in experience, so they may be
motor activity (1990); and evidence for neurons that detect holistic patterns of the sort these models need (e.g. of “optic
flow”) has been found by Duffy and Wurtz (1991).
13In philosophy of science, there have been serious concerns about whether the idea that structural relations are on-
tologically prior to relata is coherent (Wolff 2012; McKenzie 2017)—these worries apply mutatis mutandis to OSR as a
claim about the ontology of perception, and will need to be confronted by defenders of this strong program in ecological
psychology.
14This section has benefitted from discussion with Zoe Drayson.
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taken as epistemically fundamental, resulting in an “epistemological direct realism” (2017, Section 3.4).
Drayson (2017) helpfully illustrates this strategy with her intervention on the debate between Clark
and Hohwy concerning the epistemological implications of predictive processing. She argues that Clark
and Hohwy confuse three distinct types of direct/indirect dichotomy in the study of perception: psy-
chological, metaphysical, and epistemological. While the mechanism PP proposes for perception may
indeed be inferential, and thus imply indirect access to the world in the psychological sense, this result
nevertheless has no obligatory implications for either metaphysical or epistemological questions of di-
rectness. In particular, acknowledging that the mechanism of PP is inferential does not thereby imply
(as Hohwy claims) an “evidentiary boundary” between experience and the world, since without further
argument there is no reason to suppose that this mechanism “imposes evidential requirements in the first
place” (17). And it is only if the subpersonal mechanisms of perception do impose such requirements,
i.e. participate in or constrain the justification of knowledge claims, that the psychological (in)directness
of perception would have implications for its epistemological directness.
This, then, is a potential weak naturalist response to the Doctrine’s skeptical conclusion: perceptual
properties provide knowledge of the world because they are epistemically basic, i.e. the apparent access
we have to properties in the world through experience requires no further justification.15 It may be that,
as the skeptical conclusion asserts, basic experiences do not reveal anything about the intrinsic nature of
their causes, but this need not bar them from grounding facts about those causes. For instance, one might
hold that the intentional content of a perceptual experience is its adequate stimulus, e.g. the content of
a red experience is some particular surface reflectance property, the content of a “rotten egg” smell is
sulphur, etc. Then, experiences that attribute red or pungent smells to the world would be veridical if
the corresponding property were present.16 Sure, Mu¨ller may have shown that on very rare occasions
the corresponding property is not present (there is no colored surface that corresponds to the sensation
from pressure on the eye), but typically experiences are caused by their adequate stimuli, and thus taking
simple perceptual qualities to ground beliefs about their causes is epistemically secure.
The problem with this line of argument is that the “subjective phenomena” that provide the evidential
basis for perceptual science include not only sensations due to inadequate stimuli, but also sensations
due to adequate stimuli that nevertheless vary while “objective” properties remain constant. Crucially,
these variations are not rare, but rampant. Consider again the Purkinje effect: the inversion in relative
saturation between red and green regions of the spectrum in low light conditions is literally an everyday
occurrence, one that manifests itself many times a day in the modern world during our frequent passage
between bright and dim conditions as we wander through our carpentered environment. Many other color
phenomena, so-called perceptual “illusions,” confirm the highly context-sensitive and variable nature of
color experience—colors spread into nearby neutral hue areas; they vary in hue with changes in luminance
or addition of white light; contrast and brightness vary with luminance; and memory affects perceived
color, to describe just a few effects (see Fairchild 2005, Chapter 6, for extensive discussion). Analogous
effects are found amongst the primitive sensations of every sensory modality (e.g. touch: Akins 1996;
smell: Barwich 2018).
The natural response to this worry is to appeal to perceptual constancies: despite variations in the
15There is a complex tangle of issues here concerning the putative transparency of perceptual properties, and the relation
between apparent access to the world and actual access; I set these concerns aside to focus solely on the relevance of
empirical results for the naturalistic interpretation of this position, but see Lyons (2017), for further discussion.
16Note that the correct account of the content of simple perceptual sensations is by no means obvious; for some radical
alternatives to the standard weak naturalist semantics, see Akins and Hahn (2014) on color or Mattens (2017) on touch.
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stimulus reaching the retina, for instance, our assignment of colors to surfaces remains largely constant.
In fact, perceptual constancies constitute a prime behavioral motivation for inferentialism (we infer stable
surface properties from a color signal that varies with illuminant), and one which does not undermine
modest foundationalism (since these inferences are unconscious). The problem with this line of argument
is that strict constancy in perceptual qualities simply does not obtain—in the words of Fairchild (2005),
“color constancy does not exist in humans!” (132, exclamation point in the original). Fairchild emphasizes
this point because he studies color appearance, i.e. the way colors look to us, and the contextual sensitivity
of color experience poses the fundamental problem for this area of research:
When colors are closely examined, the lack of color constancy becomes extremely clear. The
study of color appearance and the derivation of color appearance models are, in fact, aiming
to quantify and predict the failure of color constancy. (132)
A critical point for our purposes here is that the color sensations studied in the color appearance literature
are not unconscious, nor only accessible through specialized training (thus, they are not susceptible to the
methodological worries of Ko¨hler 1971 [1913]). Rather, they are normal experiences of color, accessible in
untrained subjects through psychophysical methods, introspection, or careful observation. Furthermore,
this failure of precise constancy is not particular to color, but a general phenomena across all modalities.17
The worry for modest inferentialism is then this: if our perceptual beliefs about simple sensory qualities
are taken to be epistemically fundamental, then our perceptual beliefs are in widespread error, since they
do not correlate precisely with stable physical features in the world.
Of course, we do experience some significant degree of color constancy, and this tempered constancy
is an object of scientific study: can’t this apparent constancy be levied to salvage modest foundationalism
about simple perceptual qualities? For instance, one might tease apart the phenomenology of colored
surfaces to include both a belief about surface color and a belief about illuminant color, thereby hoping
to recover constancy in each (Hilbert 2012). Corresponding moves are possible in other modalities, for
instance one might attempt to save constancy of sounds with respect to sources by distinguishing auditory
features correlating with the source from those correlating with the traversed medium, as when a thud in
the next room conveys information about both the falling object and the intervening wall (Isaac 2018).
While this strategy is coherent and may be developed in detail, it comes at a cost: veridical perceptual
beliefs involve qualities far coarser than those of perceptual experience, and thus fine-grained perceptual
properties must be discounted when reckoning perceptual knowledge. But once we realize this, the claim
that perceptual beliefs are not derived by any consciously accessible process becomes suspect, since they
no longer coincide with perceptual experience itself. This then is the epistemologist’s dilemma: either she
takes perceptual beliefs to be precise, but then there is no stable external correlate to sensory qualities, and
so these beliefs are in widespread error; or she takes perceptual beliefs to be vague, but then perceptual
knowledge is far more coarse-grained than experience itself, and the claim that it is direct or underived
loses plausibility. Modest foundationalists are welcome to bite either of these bullets as they see fit, but
it is worth reflecting on the possibility of a third way.
17Other modalities are less well studied than color, so precise models of the kind found for color appearance are not yet
available. For a discussion of analogous issues in the context of olfaction, see Barwich (2018), who rejects constancy of
simple smells—“There are no stable and intrinsic links between chemicals or input sources and our perceptions such as odor
qualities”—in favor of structuralism: “Smells . . . are not so much about objects and stable object perception, but about
changes in the chemical composition of the environment” (338).
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The dilemma arises when one takes as fundamental the simple perceptual qualities at which the
Doctrine’s skeptical conclusion is directed. What if a modest foundationalist took as epistemically basic
the structural properties of perception: locations, shapes, relative colors and pitches, changes in odor,
heat, pressure, etc.? As demonstrated above, knowledge of structural properties is consistent with the
Doctrine; more generally, our experience of perceptual relations may be veridical even when experience of
simple qualities is not—the exact apparent shades of these red and yellow pens may vary greatly while their
objective physiochemical properties remain unchanged, yet the relation of this pen being more red than
that will stay stable across a wide array of contexts. This is not to say that structural properties are never
perceived in error; constancy fails for the metric properties of space such as size and distance, for instance
(Wagner 2006). Even relative sizes and distances are susceptible to distortion under extreme conditions,
as when small near objects may be confused with large distant ones in a dense forest on a moonless night or
whiteout conditions during a blizzard (Clark 2016, 8). Nevertheless, qualitative relational properties, the
very ones we experience, not some derived coarse graining, are typically perceived with greater stability,
and veridicality, than simple perceptual qualities. So, by adopting a structuralist approach, the modest
foundationalist may not completely dissolve her dilemma, but she dramatically blunts the sting of both
its horns.
Weak naturalists respect a very different set of theoretical constraints than strong naturalists. Insofar
as they aim to avoid widespread error and ground perceptual epistemology in phenomenally accessible
qualities, however, they also will best be served by adopting an epistemic structural realism.
4 The Doctrine in Philosophy of Science: From Evidence to
Exemplar
Structuralist approaches, and structural realisms in particular, have seen a resurgence in contemporary
philosophy of science (Ladyman 2016; Frigg and Votsis 2011). This movement traces its intellectual her-
itage to fin de sie`cle positivism and neo-Kantianism, a period heavily influenced by Helmholtz. For both
Helmholtz and his teacher Mu¨ller, the epistemology of science was closely entangled with the epistemology
of perception, and analogous arguments led to some form of proto-structural realism in both domains.
We might ask, then, what role the Doctrine in particular played in the origins of scientific structuralism,
and whether its influence may still be felt in philosophy of science today. Ironically, the very development
that spurred the rise of structuralism, the formalization of non-Euclidean geometry, for which Helmholtz
himself contributed the founding epistemology, itself undermined the relevance of sensory epistemology
for that of philosophy of science. Although the Doctrine no longer serves an evidential role in arguments
for structural realism, it nevertheless deserves renewed attention as an exemplar for the structuralist
program.
Recall that Mu¨ller endorsed an intertwined, two-fold structural realism (Part I). First, he was a
structural realist about sensory epistemology: all that we can know of the world through experience
are structural relations, such as relative spatial relationships or relations between cause and effect. He
took this view to occupy a moderate, intermediary position between (as he saw it) the skepticism of
Hume and the apriorism of Kant and Aristotle (Hatfield 1990, 152–7). But Mu¨ller was also a structural
realist about perceptual science, including sensory physiology: we can discover the laws that govern the
behavior of nerves, such as the Bell-Magendie law or the Doctrine itself, but we cannot know the intrinsic
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nature of nervous activity. This was itself an instance of his more general structural realism concerning
science tout court : just as Newton was able to discover the laws of gravity, but not its intrinsic nature or
underlying cause, so also science in general is able to discover and obtain knowledge concerning laws, but
not underlying natures. Just as today’s structural realists have emphasized the continuity of evidence and
mathematics across theory change, Mu¨ller invoked the progress of theories of electromagnetism, light,
and temperature despite radical disagreement about the underlying natures of these phenomena (fluids,
particles, etheric disturbances, etc.). Nerve “energies” thus have exactly the same epistemic status as
thermal, gravitational, or electromagnetic energies: empirical phenomena whose intrinsic natures are
unknowable, yet about which, to the extent they exhibit patterns of regularity, we may discover laws.
Like Mu¨ller, Helmholtz recognized a continuity across the epistemologies of perception and of science,
and argued that in both areas the only legitimate target of knowledge is structure. Yet our epistemic
access to structure is much more fragile for Helmholtz than for Mu¨ller, for Helmholtz attributed to the
mind less innate power for extracting structure from the world. For Mu¨ller, the mind has the power to
“abstract” structure from patterns of sensory input in a manner that adds nothing of epistemic relevance
to the input. In the case of the perception of space, this power conspires with the inherent spatiality
of sensory organs to provide an epistemically fundamental spatial experience in two dimensions (Part I,
especially footnote 7; Hatfield 1990, 154–5); in the case of causality, it allowed Mu¨ller to reject Hume’s
skepticism about our ability to know causal structure, since it may be abstracted without mediation from
our experience of patterns in the succession of events. Helmholtz, however, accepted no such power,
leading to his insistence that neither spatiality, nor causality, could be epistemically fundamental.
In the case of causality, Helmholtz recognized that inferences from phenomena to laws required the
assumption that regular variation itself constitutes evidence for underlying causal structure. Already
in his 1847 treatise on the conservation of force, Helmholtz identified this inferential principle as the
causal law (Gesetze der Causalita¨t), namely the assumption that every change (Vera¨nderung) in nature
must have a sufficient cause (zureichende Ursache), and argued this principle constitutes the fundamental
presupposition behind natural science (2–3):
We are compelled to and justified in [geno¨thigt und berechtigt ] this undertaking by the fun-
damental principle that every change in nature must have a sufficient cause. The proximate
causes, to which we refer natural phenomena, are themselves either invariable or variable; in
the latter case, the same fundamental principle compels us to seek still further for the causes
of the variation, and so on, until we arrive finally at causes which operate according to invari-
able law and which consequently produce under the same external conditions the same effect
every time. Thus the final goal of the theoretical natural sciences is to discover the ultimate
invariable causes of natural phenomena. (1971 [1847], 4)
Only when we can trace perceived variation back to some invariant principle is nature comprehensible
(begreiflich); although it is not guaranteed that such invariants may be found,
it is clear that science, the goal of which is the comprehension of nature, must begin with
the presupposition of its comprehensibility and proceed in accordance with this assumption,
until, perhaps, it is forced by irrefutable facts to recognize limits beyond which it may not go.
(4)
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This remarkable passage mandates a close complementarity between the methods of science and their
justification. On the one hand, the natural scientist proceeds by seeking invariant principles that explain,
or make comprehensible, variations in the phenomena. On the other hand, it is the assumption that this
procedure is possible, and that nature is susceptible to description in terms of invariant causes, that itself
justifies this endeavor.
This passage also illustrates the close analog between Helmholtz’s reasoning about perception and
his reasoning about science. For, in the case of perception as well, it is the variations in phenomenal
experience induced by our probing of the world (analogous to experimentation) that produce structural
knowledge. When combined with the Doctrine’s skeptical result concerning simple phenomenal qualities,
this reasoning led Helmholtz to his Zeichentheorie of perceptual representation. It is widely held that
the Zeichentheorie extends to the epistemology of science, in part because Helmholtz draws analogies
between sensory physiology and science in general both when discussing the former (Helmholtz 1977
[1878]; 1962 [1910]) and the latter (Helmholtz 1995 [1869]), even asserting that “science is nothing but
methodologically and deliberately completed and purified experience” (Helmholtz 1971 [1894], 528).18
Yet, logically, a general Zeichentheorie-type view need not follow from perceptual considerations.
For, if one recognizes that science involves the construction of representations, akin to those we use in
language insofar as their primitive symbols bear no intrinsic similarity to their referents, and combines
this assumption with Helmholtz’s characterization of the scientific method as a procedure for determining
and corroborating invariant relations in the world, then one will arrive at structuralism without appealing
directly to perception at all. Helmholtz himself wanders close to this line of reasoning when he stresses
that science should be understood as a mode of “concept formation” (Helmholtz 1971 [1894], 520).
This view is more explicitly stated by Helmholtz’s student Hertz in the introduction to his Principles
of Mechanics. Hertz’s Bild (or “picture”) theory takes both mental and scientific representation to
succeed insofar as it mirrors the relational structure of its objects, i.e. “the consequents of the images
in thought are always the images of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured” (1899,
1). The most we can aim for in science, then, is to construct an image which is “permissible” (internally
consistent), “correct” (empirically adequate), and relatively “appropriate,” i.e. “pictures more of the
essential relations of the object” while invoking a “smaller number of superfluous or empty relations” (2).
Hertz takes such a scientific image to be analogous to a “grammar,” in that it systematizes some natural
system in a context-sensitive way—just as the linguist and the foreign language student consult different
grammars, which may be assessed for appropriateness only with regard to their respective purposes, so
also different scientific images may be evaluated only with respect to contextual criteria (40; Leroux
2001). The upshot of these considerations for Hertz’s epistemology of science is that, even if one is
committed to the empiricist principle that “experience alone” determines “the value or worthlessness”
of some scientific image, the process of image construction itself, i.e. “the formation of ideas and the
development of their relations” (Hertz 1899, 135) confers a priori justification on structural features of
scientific theory (Patton 2009; c.f. Schiemann 1998).
These early tentative steps in the history of scientific structuralism, from Mu¨ller through Helmholtz
to Hertz, imply several morals. First, not all arguments for structural realism fall neatly into the bipartite
18A more detailed discussion of Helmholtz’s epistemology would address the change in his views over time—the “realist”
passage quoted above is quite early, yet later writings on perception are more circumspect concerning any ontological
implications of the causal law (cf. footnote 9). Nevertheless, Helmtholtz’s perspective remains resolutely structuralist
throughout, and my intent is to illustrate this feature, while eliding subtle exegetical questions.
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taxonomy of Psillos (2001). Psillos identifies an “upward path” and a “downward path” to structural
realism: the first begins from general empiricist considerations, for instance that knowledge is grounded
in perception, and strives toward a tentative realism about science in particular; the second begins from
a realist commitment to the epistemic value of science, and falls back on a structuralist epistemology
in response to challenges from underdetermination or incommensurability. Yet the structural realism of
Mu¨ller and Helmholtz is grounded in an analogy between perception and science that treats neither as
foundational: their structuralist account of scientific knowledge is indeed informed by their understanding
of the epistemology of perception, yet their mitigated realism about perceptual knowledge is (conversely)
a consequence of their commitment to the epistemic significance of results from the science of perception.
A second moral concerns the role of perceptual epistemology, and thus the Doctrine, in even the
upward path toward structural realism. The views of Mu¨ller and Hertz illustrate how empiricist consid-
erations may derive from a theory of concept formation, or even general considerations about the nature
of language and symbolic representation,19 without needing to detour through the details of perception
itself. So, while the contemporary, upward path structural realist who grounds epistemology in per-
ception will find the Doctrine a welcome ally, it may be irrelevant to those upward path structuralists
whose empiricist inclinations are otherwise motivated. Unlike contemporary philosophy of perception
then, which must attend to the Doctrine on pain of violating naturalism, contemporary philosophy of
science, it seems, may safely ignore it.
Nevertheless, a third moral hints at a new role for sensory physiology in the contemporary dialec-
tic. The trajectory from Mu¨ller through Hertz was shaped in part by two emerging notions that have
proved critical for philosophy of science well beyond the bounds of the realism debate: isomorphism
and invariance (Leroux 2001; Daston and Galison 2010, Chapter 5; cf. Suppes 2002). An isomorphism
is a structure-preserving map, a mathematical relationship that characterizes sameness or similarity of
structure. Hertz’s description of the relationship between a scientific image and the world can be read as
a demand for isomorphism: relations of necessary consequence must be preserved across the map from
images to objects in nature. Helmholtz characterized the construction of such images in terms of the
search for the invariants that explain apparent variation in the phenomena. A tentative moral then is
this: whatever we name these invariants (laws, causes, regularities, etc.) it is their invariance itself that is
the relevant feature preserved across isomorphisms. This lesson may be learned even from Mu¨ller, whose
mechanism for the power of abstraction allows differences between ideas to fade leaving only what is
common amongst them, i.e. the invariant features of the general concept (Part I, Section 2). This lesson
applies wherever isomorphism is taken as the relevant notion for comparing parts of science, for instance
the semantic view of theories (Suppe 1977), a view adopted not only by structural realists (Ladyman
1998), but also other forms of realism (Chakravartty 2001) and empiricism (van Fraassen 1980)
Invariance across isomorphism emerged as the critical concept for modern geometry, as well; a de-
velopment that found its first epistemologist in Helmholtz, but which, ironically, itself spurred the shift
from perception to conception as the heart of empiricist philosophy of science. Although non-Euclidean
geometries had already been discovered by Gauss and Lobachevsky, it was Reimann’s Habilitation of 1854
that introduced the formal notion of a manifold as the most general geometrical structure, including a
19Another proto-structuralist, Poincare´, illustrates this point as well, although his philosophical views developed inde-
pendently of the trajectory considered here. Poincare´ takes objectivity in science to turn on what can be communicated,
and since only relations may be communicated, “the sole objective reality consists in the relations of things” (Poincare´ 1958
[1905], 350; Brading and Crull 2017)
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conceptual analysis of distance (or metric) as the superposition of magnitudes. In 1868, Helmholtz pub-
lished the first of a series of investigations into the epistemological implications of this new geometrical
framework, which he had discovered independently. Helmholtz points out that the principle of mea-
surent of distance by superposition allows inhabitants of a non-Euclidean world to empirically discover
the geometry they inhabit, thereby refuting Kant’s claim that geometrical structure is given a priori in
intuition (Helmholtz 1977 [1868]). What must be assumed for this analysis to proceed, however, is the
rigidity of rods, or the invariance of their lengths. In 1872, Klein’s Erlangen program followed this line
of reasoning to its logical conclusion, individuating geometries in terms of the structures they take to
be invariant, equivalently, the transformations (i.e. automorphisms, or isomorphisms of space onto itself)
that leave their axioms unchanged.
These mathematical developments became fundamentally important for the epistemology of science
with the discovery that physical laws remain invariant across the Lorentz transformations, a result cul-
minating in Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity, on which physical space is non-Euclidean. While
Helmholtz’s initial epistemology of non-Euclidean geometry was motivated in part by considerations of
what was innate or not in our perception of space, the discovery that space was actually non-Euclidean
motivated a crisis in philosophers’ understanding of scientific concept formation, seemingly distancing it
from any grounding in perceptual experience. Divergent responses to this crisis manifested themselves
in the work of the two 20th century philosophers who most explicitly acknowledged an early debt to
Helmholtz: Schlick and Cassirer (Ryckman 1991; cf. Gower 2000).20 Both took the concept of isomor-
phism (more properly its terminological precursor Zuordnung, or “coordination,” Ryckman 1991, 69) to
capture the fundamental insight from Helmholtz’s Zeichentheorie for analyzing the epistemological im-
plications of the new science. Yet they differed in their attention to the role of invariance. Schlick allowed
(contra Hertz) that uniquely correct models of the world are possible (Schlick 1920, 85–6), and may be
put in direct coincidence with external causal relations, motivating a stronger conception of realism than
Helmholtz himself accepted (Friedman 1997). In contrast, Cassirer emphasized throughout his work the
key role of invariance, and that all that can be extracted from the world on the structuralist viewpoint
are its invariant relations (Cassirer 1923 [1910]; Lovrenov 2006), a perspective he would later reapply
to perception itself (Cassirer 1944 [1938]). While Schlick’s transmission of a transformed, logico-centric
Zeichentheorie to the Vienna Circle resulted in a fruitful, but ultimately brittle research program, Cas-
sirer’s more abstract invariance-based approach lay fallow, only recently rediscovered and reclaimed by
contemporary structural realists (e.g. French 2014).
These final reflections indicate a possible role for the Doctrine in contemporary philosophy of science.
For today’s structural realisms are embroiled in a number of internecine disputes, concerning especially
the question of the nature of the map between theory and world, and the ontological question of what
exactly a structuralist should be realist about (Frigg 2006; Frigg and Votsis 2011; McKenzie 2017).
Many of the details of this debate are rooted in a post-Positivist concern for fundamental physics and
mathematized philosophy, yet philosophy of science as a whole has become more ecumenical, turning
attention to biology and the social sciences as equally legitimate examples of scientific inquiry. Sensory
physiology, and the epistemological reflections arising from the Doctrine, deserves acknowledgment and
study as an exemplar of structuralist reasoning in an area other than physics, one which proved fruitful
20Schlick was instrumental in promoting Helmholtz’s importance as a philosopher through editing the 1921 centenary
collection of his epistemological writings, and cites him in key works. Cassirer gives Helmholtz pride of place as the
culmination of a long trend toward structuralism in the latter chapters of his 1923 [1910] Substance and Function.
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in inspiring the structuralist perspective in the first place. If today’s structuralists turn their attentions
past physics to the sciences beyond, it may yet prove inspirational again.
5 Conclusion: Realism without Tears
Mu¨ller’s Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies implies a skeptical conclusion: our sensory experience does
not reveal the nature of its causes, nor does it provide us with any direct access to basic properties in
the world. He derives this conclusion from incontrovertible empirical results and three methodological
principles. Since these principles have become enshrined in the contemporary science of perception,
grounding the study of the neurophysiology, psychology, and psychophysics of perception, this skeptical
conclusion remains an unequivocal part of the naturalistic worldview.
Nevertheless, naturalists need not be global skeptics. Mu¨ller, Helmholtz, and others who reflected
on the Doctrine chose instead to embrace epistemic structural realism, the view that structural relations
between simple perceptual properties may convey knowledge of structural features in the world. Recent
emphasis on embodied action as part of the mechanism by which perceptual content is determined does
not constitute a radical break with Helmholtz and the Doctrine, but instead escapes skepticism through
essentially the same route: active exploration produces patterns in our sensory experience that may
ground our knowledge of relations in the world. Likewise, the weak naturalist who takes conscious
perceptual experience to be epistemically direct, in the sense that it requires no further justification,
builds her epistemology on firmer ground if she accepts its structural relations as epistemically primitive,
rather than the simple qualities with which the Doctrine is concerned.
Philosophy of Science is less beholden to the Doctrine. Today’s structural realists rarely ground their
epistemology in that of perception, though historically their roots trace back to Mu¨ller, since he influenced
Helmholtz, du Bois-Reymond, and Mach, who in turn influenced Hertz, Cassirer, and Schlick, and through
them both neo-Kantians and Logical Positivists. Nevetheless, the very questions in the epistemology of
geometry that reinforced for Helmholtz a close analogy between perception and science divorced science
from the epistemology of perception with the rise of General Relativity. Still, contemporary structural
realists have lessons to learn from early perceptual structuralism, for instance, the value of invariance.
Sensory physiology undermines the na¨ıve view that perceptual experience puts us into direct contact
with the world, but it suggests a more tempered realism to replace it. This realism rests our knowledge
of the world not on pre-established harmony, nor favorable statistics, but our own exploratory activity,
experiment, and engagement with the world. It is a realism for active epistemic agents, and as such,
realism both easy and enough.
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